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in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature
but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 66
also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere
by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the
universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many,
but of them each is one, since it is universal.
There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is unjust,
and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing is unjust
by nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it has been done,
is an act of injustice, but before it is done is not yet that but
is unjust. So, too, with an act of justice (though the general term
is rather 'just action', and 'act of justice' is applied to the
correction
of the act of injustice).
Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the
nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with
which it is concerned.
8
Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts
unjustly
or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily,
he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for
he does things which happen to be just or unjust. Whether an act is
or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its
voluntariness
or involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at
the same time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things
that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be
not present as well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before,
any of the things in a man's own power which he does with knowledge,
i.e. not in ignorance either of the person acted on or of the instrument
used or of the end that will be attained (e.g. whom he is striking,
with what, and to what end), each such act being done not incidentally
nor under compulsion (e.g. if A takes B's hand and therewith strikes
C, B does not act voluntarily; for the act was not in his own power).
The person struck may be the striker's father, and the striker may
know that it is a man or one of the persons present, but not know
that it is his father; a similar distinction may be made in the case
of the end, and with regard to the whole action. Therefore that which
is done in ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is not in the
agent's power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary (for many
natural processes, even, we knowingly both perform and experience,
none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; e.g. growing old
or dying). But in the case of unjust and just acts alike the injustice
or justice may be only incidental; for a man might return a deposit
unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to
do what is just or to act justly, except in an incidental way. Similarly
the man who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return the deposit
must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only
incidentally.
Of voluntary acts we do some by choice, others not by choice; by choice
those which we do after deliberation, not by choice those which we
do without previous deliberation. Thus there are three kinds of injury
in transactions between man and man; those done in ignorance are
mistakes
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 67
when the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end that
will be attained is other than the agent supposed; the agent thought
either that he was not hiting any one or that he was not hitting with
this missile or not hitting this person or to this end, but a result
followed other than that which he thought likely (e.g. he threw not
with intent to wound but only to prick), or the person hit or the
missile was other than he supposed. Now when (1) the injury takes
place contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misadventure. When
(2) it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but does not imply
vice, it is a mistake (for a man makes a mistake when the fault
originates
in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin lies outside
him). When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation,
it is an act of injustice-e.g. the acts due to anger or to other
passions
necessary or natural to man; for when men do such harmful and mistaken
acts they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this
does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury
is not due to vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an
unjust man and a vicious man.
Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done
of malice aforethought; for it is not the man who acts in anger but
he who enraged him that starts the mischief. Again, the matter in
dispute is not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice;
for it is apparent injustice that occasions rage. For they do not
dispute about the occurrence of the act-as in commercial transactions
where one of the two parties must be vicious-unless they do so owing
to forgetfulness; but, agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which
side justice lies (whereas a man who has deliberately injured another
cannot help knowing that he has done so), so that the one thinks he
is being treated unjustly and the other disagrees.
But if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these
are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust man,
provided that the act violates proportion or equality. Similarly,
a man is just when he acts justly by choice; but he acts justly if
he merely acts voluntarily.
Of involuntary acts some are excusable, others not. For the mistakes
which men make not only in ignorance but also from ignorance are
excusable,
while those which men do not from ignorance but (though they do them
in ignorance) owing to a passion which is neither natural nor such
as man is liable to, are not excusable.
9
Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering and doing
of injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth in expressed in
Euripides' paradoxical words:
I slew my mother, that's my tale in brief.
Were you both willing, or unwilling both?
Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly, or is all
suffering
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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 68
of injustice the contrary involuntary, as all unjust action is
voluntary?
And is all suffering of injustice of the latter kind or else all of
the former, or is it sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary? So,
too, with the case of being justly treated; all just action is
voluntary,
so that it is reasonable that there should be a similar opposition
in either case-that both being unjustly and being justly treated should
be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary. But it would be thought
paradoxical even in the case of being justly treated, if it were always
voluntary; for some are unwillingly treated justly. (2) One might
raise this question also, whether every one who has suffered what [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]