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102 Neverending Wars
ratist (Gurr and Harff 1994; Minahan 1995), the Moro groups dis-
agreed to a considerable extent on their war aims. Indeed, disunity
among the groups has been a major aspect of the conflict. For four of
the five major Moro groups, the goals of the civil war ranged from
greater regional autonomy to full independence and statehood (Che
Man 1990). The most radical faction of the Moro did aim to create an
independent nation-state, but the other three groups were more con-
cerned with negotiating greater autonomy with the Philippine govern-
ment. The fifth group held a significantly different aim, hoping to
make the Philippines an Islamic state, and explicitly did not desire to
create an independent state (Che Man 1990). As only one of the five
major groups claimed national independence as a goal, it is question-
able whether the separatist label should be applied to the Moro civil
war as a whole. But nationalist claims did serve to provide a semblance
of unity among the fragmented groups of the Moro opposition, even
though these claims should not necessarily be taken at face value as an
authentic expression of Islamic nationalism or ethnic solidarity.
As the example of the Moro suggests, the diversity of aims that can
be embodied in a patchwork coalition implies that concessions that
might satisfy some members of the opposition are unlikely to satisfy
others. After all, how much autonomy will suffice to end the conflict,
when even complete independence might not be adequate for the fac-
tion that hopes to make the Philippines an Islamic state? Although the
government of the Philippines has satisfied some Moro leaders by
allowing greater regional autonomy to Moro districts, low-intensity
fighting has continued because other groups with different goals re-
main unappeased. This outcome is typical in weak states. Civil wars are
often prolonged because the lack of rebel consensus on war aims pre-
vents successful negotiation, even when governments are willing to
grant concessions. Claims to greater autonomy, the particulars left un-
specified, may suffice to unite disparate groups in order to begin a war,
but governmental concessions of greater autonomy are rarely sufficient
to end the war.
Ethnic Conflict Reconsidered
I have argued that civil wars in weak states are driven by the disorgani-
zation of the opposition, coupled with deficiencies in the governmental
Ethnic Conflict in Weak States 103
and military capabilities of the state, rather than by the particular iden-
tification of the groups involved. Identity-based groups mobilize in
strong states, but rarely instigate civil war because of the availability of
other avenues for political change and unwillingness to confront the
military strength of the state. Identity-based groups in weak states find
far fewer options for nonviolent political change. As a result, these
groups are more likely to turn to civil war as a means of instituting
change.
The civil wars fought by identity-based groups in weak states do not
appear to be different in their dynamics or intractability from civil wars
fought by more conventional class- or politically based groups in these
states. In addition, I have suggested that those aspects of civil wars that
have been attributed to their identity-based nature, such as the partici-
pation of identity-based groups, grievances of experiences of discrimi-
nation and oppression, and nationalist claims, are actually expressions
of normal politics in weak states, rather than of identity-based groups
specifically. Thus the greater frequency of lengthy civil wars and eth-
nic politics in weak states is due to the military and governmental in-
capacities of the state rather than the attributes of the identity-based
group itself.
The argument presented in this chapter challenges scholars of ethnic
conflict to clarify and defend the uniqueness of the territory they have
staked out. As one writer has complained, the term ethnic conflict
has become a euphemism for substate conflicts we cannot explain or
comprehend (Marshall 1997:82). It is not valid simply to assume that
ethnic conflict and identity politics are necessarily distinct and de-
serving of study in isolation from other types of civil conflict. Instead,
students of ethnic conflict must provide theoretical arguments and em-
pirical demonstrations of the distinctiveness of the dynamics of identity
politics in civil wars in order to justify the analytical uniqueness of their
domain.
5
The Effects of the Cold War
scholars have branded many Third World civil wars
as proxy wars conflicts that were an expression of the larger Cold
War hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union
(Gaddis 1997; George and Smoke 1974). Thus it seems uncontrover-
sial to claim that the interstate rivalry of the Cold War affected civil
wars of the period. Yet analysts have failed to address one important is-
sue: why were the superpowers so concerned with civil wars in the
Third World? After all, weak, recently independent states were un-
likely to make a significant military contribution if a world war were
to break out between the superpowers. The attention paid to the politi-
cal commitments of weak states in the Cold War was unusual from a
historical standpoint. Previous rivalries between powerful states did
not typically extend to conflicts of peripheral states, but remained cen-
tered on the primary quarreling parties (Frederick 1999; Black 1999).
Upon reflection, it is surprising that these peripheral states, which
ought to have been militarily and strategically irrelevant to the Cold
War, gained so much attention and resources from the superpowers.
An explanation for how and why the Cold War lengthened civil wars
in the post-1945 period is due. Arguments of the Cold War have tradi-
tionally fallen under the jurisdiction of political realists, but the effects
of the Cold War on weak-state civil wars cannot be understood as the
necessary outcome of a Great Power rivalry. Instead, its cognitive and
104
The Effects of the Cold War 105
ideological aspects were the essential factors. In the first place, the con-
ceptual framework shared by Cold War participants rendered the po-
litical stances and alignment of weak states relevant to the interests of
the superpowers. The ideological focus of the Cold War and its partic-
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